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THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT AND
NEW YORK CITY
During the 1961-1975 fiscal period, New York City's governmental
and financial obligations increased more rapidly than its available
financial resources.' Since the difficult political choice of raising
taxes or reducing services to appropriate levels was shunned by city
officials,' budget deficits grew annually.3 To close these gaps and
1. [19761 MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ANNUAL REPORT
8, at 4-7 [hereinafter cited as [1976] MAC REPORT].
2. Shalala & Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1119,
1122 [hereinafter. cited as Shalala & Bellamy].
In 1965, Mayor Robert F. Wagner declared in his budget message that he did *"not propose
to permit [the city's] fiscal problems to set the limits of [its] committments to meet the
essential needs of the people of the city." By 1975, fourteen percent of New York's citizens
were on welfare. In addition; the City supported nineteen municipal hospitals, free tuition
at the City University, day care centers, foster homes, and many other public services. As a
result of attempted income redistribution, much of the tax base was also redistributed caus-
ing businesses, and therefore jobs, to leave the city. Auletta, Who's to Blame for the Fix
We're In, NEW YoRK MAGAZINE, Oct. 27, 1975, at 29, revised & reprinted in K. AULETrA, THE
STREETS WERE PAVED WITH GOLD (1979). ,
3. TABLE 1
NEW YORK CITY RPCEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND
BUDGET DEFICITSa, FISCAL YEARS 1967-75
($ in millions)
Accumulated
Fiscal Expendi- Budget Budget
Year Receipts tures Deficits Deficits
1966-67 4,346 4,461 -115 -115
1967-68 5,116 5,263 -147 -262
1968-69 5,968 6,044 - 76 -338
1969-70 6,469 6,836 -367 -705
1970-71 7,072 7,359 -287 -992
1971-72 8,224 8,389 -165 -1,157
1972-73 9,166' 9,686 -520 -1,677
1973-74 9,723 10,380 -657 -2,334
1974-75 11,911 12,201 -290 -2,624
(a) Total receipts include general fund, real estate taxes, grants from federal and state
governments, sales of property and other receipts (fees, charges, and similar receipts). Total
expenditures cover operating expenditures, debt service, liquidation of encumbrances, and
redemption of city notes.
A. Orr & J. Yoo, NEW YORK CITY's FIscAL CRISIS 4 (1975).
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present a technically balanced budget,' the city resorted to various
borrowing techniques. While municipal borrowing is not in itself
improper, New York City abused both its short-term and long-term
borrowing powers.' Additionally, the city used public benefit corpo-
rations to avoid constitutional and statutory debt limits. This
comment will overview those borrowing techniques used by the
City of New York which ultimately led to the fiscal crisis of 1975.
Part I will review long-term debt practices; Part II will review
short-term debt practices; and Part III will review the city's -use
of public benefit corporations.
I. Long Term Debt Practices
Most state and local governments'finance capital projects by issu-
ing long-term debt, usually in the form of bonds.' The rationale for
financing capital projects through long-term borrowing is that it
permits the repayment of the debt to be amortized over the useful
life of the project, thus requiring all taxpayers who benefit from the
project to contribute to its payment.7 The power to issue long-term
debt, however, is limited by the New York State Constitution.8 The
constitution limits city debt for general municipal purposes to no
more than ten percent of the latest five-year average of full valua-
tion of taxable real estate within the city The city may incur
additional debt for housing and urban renewal purposes. Such debt
is limited by two percent of the five-year average of assessed valua-
4. The City Charter requires the City Council to establish a balanced budget. NEW YORK
CITY CHARTER § 1515.
5. "It was the misuse of borrowing that distinguished New York from other cities and was
the fundamental cause of the city's most recent crisis." Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 2, at
1124.
6. "Bonds are long-term obligations, maturing in not less than one year. Sold primarily
to finance long-term capital investments, bonds have traditionally comprised the bulk of
state and local government financing, although this pattern has altered [somewhat] over the
past decade." FORBES & PETERSEN, BACKGROUND PAPER TO BUILDING A BROADER MARKET:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET 38
(1976) (quoted in Shalala & Bellamy, supra note 2, at 1124 n.18). Capital projects are also
financed, in part, by the receipt of state and federal grants. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ECON. STAB.
OF THE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. AND URB. AFFAIRS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N STAFF
REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. ch.
2, at 66 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SEC STAFF REPORT].
7. A. STEISS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING 109 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STEIS].
8. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII.
9. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
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tion of taxable real estate within the city.10 The constitution ex-
cludes from the debt ceilings funds borrowed to finance certain
enumerated capital improvements." Consequently, the city's unen-
cumbered margin' does not accurately reflect the full extent of the
city's outstanding long-term indebtedness. 3
New York City's budget is subject to further regulation in addi-
tion to the restraints imposed by the Constitution. The New York
Local Finance Law" and the City Charter 5 govern city finances as
well. The City Charter requires city officials to prepare two distinct
budgets: an expense budget'6 and a capital budget. 7 The expense
budget is an estimate of the city's recurring municipal operating
expenses for the upcoming fiscal year. 8 It also contains an estimate
of incoming revenues to be used to finance the operating expenses. I
A major source of revenue for both current operating expenses and
10. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4.
11. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7, 7-a, 11.
Excluded from the limitation. . are numerous types of obligations, such as obliga-
tions issued in anticipation of taxes on real estate, in anticipation of revenues, or in
anticipation of State aid . . . such obligations falling within the category known as
temporary loans; also water debt, housing debt, debt for revenue-producing improve-
ments, and certain local arrangements.
Lounsberry, The Scope and Basis of the Local Finance Law, Preface to N.Y. LOCAL FIN.
LAW, at xiv (McKinney 1968).
12. "The unencumbered debt margin, which differs from the legal debt incurring power,
represents the amount of additional appropriations and authorizations for capital expendi-
tures within the debt limit that could be made without exceeding the city's legal authority
to borrow." [1978] COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ANN. REP. xii [hereinafter cited
as [1978] ANNUAL REPORT].
13. The Temporary Commission on City Finances estimates that due to the many excep-
tions to the debt limit, the city's outstanding debt is more than 50 percent greater than the
apparent debt limit. TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON CITY FINANCES, FINAL REPORT, THE CITY IN
TRANSITION: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES FOR NEW YORK 161 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
REPORT].
14. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW (McKinney 1968).
15. 1972 NEW YORK Crr CHARTER (superseded by 1976 Charter) [hereinafter cited as 1972
CITY CHARTER].
16. 1972 Crr CHARTER, supra note ,15, ch. 6.
17. Id. ch. 9. See note 6 supra, and accompanying text.
18. 1972 CITY CHARTER, supra note 15, ch. 9, § 117. Recurring expenses include the cost
of police and fire protection, sanitation, education, health and social services, and debt
service. The recurring revenues which finance these expenses include the real estate tax, sales
tax, personal and business income taxes, a variety of other charges and fees, and federal and
state aid accounted for in the "General Fund." [1975-1976] COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, ANN. REP. 140-41 [hereinafter cited as [1975-1976] ANNUAL REPORT].
19. 1972 Crrv CHARTER, supra note 15, ch. 9, § 117.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
long-term debt payment is the city's real estate tax.20 The real
estate tax which the city may impose for expense budget purposes
is limited by the New York Constitution to a maximum rate of two
and one half percent of the average full valuation of taxable real
estate within the city.2 This limit may only be exceeded to provide
for the city's debt-service obligations. 2 The expense budget, then,
is linked to the annual real estate tax levy, a limited revenue source.
The City Charter directs the City Council to set the annual real
estate tax rate at a level which will produce a balanced expense
budget.23
While the expense budget is designed to match recurring operat-
ing expenses with recurring revenues, 4 the capital budget is de-
signed to finance capital improvements through long-term borrow-
ing and state and federal aid. 25 Capital projects are defined by the
City Charter to encompass little more than physical public im-
provements ("brick and mortar projects"). 21 The city's ability to
finance these projects is limited only by the constitutional debt
limits and the marketability of its municipal bonds and notes.
The city's abuse of long-term borrowing is reflected in the growth
20. City real estate tax revenues more than doubled during the 1961-1975 fiscal period.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 66-67.
21. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
22. Id., art. VIII, § 11. Debt service obligation refers to the amount the city was required
to pay in the proceeding fiscal year for interest on and amortization of the debt contracted
for a capital project. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 123.00(b)(1) (McKinney 1968).
Article 8 of the State Constitution requires the city to pledge its full faith and credit
for the payment of the principal of and interest on all its debt obligations. Annual
appropriations must be sufficient for such payments, except for the principal on cer-
tain notes explicitly excluded from the mandatory annual appropriation requirement.
The required appropriations are not subject to the limitation of taxes on real estate to
2.5% (the "Basic Tax Limit") of the latest five-year average full valuation of taxable
real estate in the city (the "Tax Base").
[1978] ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 33.
23. 1972 CITY CHARTER, supra note 15, § 1515.
24. See note 18 supra.
25. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, ch. 2, at 66.
26. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER, § 211, provides in pertinent part: "1. The term 'capital
project' shall mean: (a) Any physical public betterment or improvement . . . . (d) Any
public betterment involving either a physical improvement or the acquisition of real property
for a physical improvement .. "
27. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, ch. 2, at 68. See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 13,
at 156.
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of expense budget items financed under the capital budget." As
operating costs exceeded available resources, city officials chose to
finance expense items from the capital budget. This capitalization
of operating expenses is a form of deficit financing, a gap-closing
technique used as an alternative to raising taxes and reducing serv-
ices." "The transfer of operating items to the capital budget derives
from the simple political fact that it is easier to impose a tax in some
future year than in the current budget.""0 During the 1965-1975
fiscal period, the capitalization of operating expenses rose from $26
28.
TABLE 2
BORROWING FOR CURRENT EXPENSES IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK:
FISCAL YEARS 1965-1975
($ in millions)
Percentage
Fiscal Total City Borrowing for of City
Year Funds Current Expenses Funds
1965 $ 720 $ 26 3.6%
1966 590 57 9.7
1967 538 68 12.6
1968 673 68 10.0
1969 619 84 13.6
1970 800 151 18.9
1971 1,004 195 19.4
1972 1,162 226 19.4
1973 1,342 274 20.0
1974 1,359 564 41.5
1975 1,376 724 52.6
FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 157.
29. Id.
As early as 1966, the Temporary Commission on City Finances warned that
borrowing for current expenses is an unsound practice .... Its unfavorable influence
in the case of New York City may be summarized as follows: It encroaches on borrow-
ing power needed for other purposes. It is detrimental to the City's credit standing. It
results in unjustified interest cost. It conceals and postpones the impact of current
expenses on taxes. It increases annual borrowing significantly and expands outstand-
ing debt.
TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON CITY FINANCES, FINAL REPORT, BETTER FINANCING FOR NEW YORK
Crrv 79-80 (1966) [hereinafter cited as TCCF.]
30. A. SCHICK, CENTRAL BUDGET ISSUES UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER 94 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as A. SCHICK].
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million to $724 million.3 In 1975, over fifty percent of the city's
capital budget appropriations was used to finance operating expen-
ses.32
The New York Constitution and the New York Local Finance Law
restricts those expenses which may be financed out of the capital
budget to capital projects having useful lives extending beyond the
current fiscal year.33 The constitution limits contracted indebted-
ness for a capital project to a period no longer than the "probable
usefulness of the object or purpose for which such indebtedness is
to be contracted. ' 34 This period is to be determined by or pursuant
to general or special laws, which determination shall be conclusive.35
The periods of probable usefulness for certain objects and purposes
are cataloged in section 11.00 of the Local Finance Law.36 Therefore,
when the city began to issue bonds to finance operating expenses it
had to obtain an amendment to section 11.00 which would assign a
period of probable usefulness to particular operating expenses. Such
amendments would, in effect, redefine an operating expense as a
capital improvement. As so defined, a particular item could then be
financed out of the city's capital budget.
The numerous amendments to section 11.00 illustrate the preval-
ence of this practice. In 1964, an amendment to section 11.00 as-
signed a three-year period of probable usefulness to the expenses
incurred by a municipality in conducting a special population cen-
sus.37 In 1967, another amendment to section 11.00 gave a three-year
period of probable usefulness to the cost of codifying municipal
laws.38 In 1968, the city sponsored and the legislature enacted an
amendment to section 11.00 which assigned a thirty-year period of
probable usefulness for "job and business opportunity expansion
programs of municipalities. '3 Pursuant to this amendment, the
31. See note 28 supra.
32. Id.
33. Although the New York City Charter defines "capital project," the state constitution
and the New York Local Finance Law actually controls whether an item may be financed
out of the capital budget. A. SCHICK, supra note 30, at 93.
34. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
35. Id.
36. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00(a) (McKinney 1968).
37. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00(a)(71) (McKinney 1968).
38. Id. § 11.00(a)(72).
39. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00(a)(73) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
[Vol. VIII
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city financed manpower training programs out of the capital
budget.4 0 These expenses, however, should have been financed
through the expense budget." In 1973, an amendment to section
11.00 permitted the city to issue bonds in order to pay annual rents
owed to the "lessor or sublessor of real property leased or subleased
for any public or municipal purpose . "..."42 Also in 1973, section
11.00 was amended to assign a five-year period of probable useful-
ness to programs providing social and technical assistance to ten-
ants eligible for public assistance. 3 These amendments created cap-
ital projects which do not fit the definition of "capital project"
found in'the City Charter." Although the city was criticized as early
as 1966 for its growing use of capital funds to finance operating
expenses,45 this practice was more appealing to elected officials than
customarily politically unpopular tax increases and service reduc-
tions."
40. CITIZENS BUDGET COMMISSION, INC., NEW YORK CITY'S DET PROBLEM 11 (July 1973)
[hereinafter cited as CBC]. See also note 45 infra.
41. CBC, supra note 40, at 11. "What is ...ominous is the concept of treating educa-
tional expenses as Capital Budget items. . . .The potential for fiscal mischief by use of this
justification, is practically unlimited." Id.
42. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00(a)(78) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
43. Id. § 11.00(a)(79).
44. See note 26 supra.
45. TCCF, supra note 29, at 79-80. THE CITIZENS BUDGET COMMISSION, REPORT ON NEW
YORK, THE SHADOW BUDGET (June, 1969) [hereinafter cited as THE SHADOW BUDGET]. The
Citizens Budget Commission, Inc., located on 110 East 42nd Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10017, is a
non-partisan civic research organization supported by public contributions which issues peri-
odic reports on New York fiscal issues.
46. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 156. The city has been ordered to reform its capital
budget practices by the 1976 City Charter and the 1975 Municipal Assistance Corporation
legislation. Id. at 163.
Notably, the Court of Appeals, in Hurd v. City of Buffalo, 34 N.Y.2d 628, 311 N.E.2d 504,
355 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1974) (memo opinion), aff'g 41 A.D.2d 402, 343 N.Y.S.2d 950 (4th Dep't
1973), held unconstitutional a statute which gave a period of probable usefulness of three
years for Buffalo's future requirements for pension and retirement liabilities. 34 N.Y.2d at
629, 311 N.E.2d at 504, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 370. The earlier Appellate Division decision viewed
this classification as an ongoing subterfuge of the constitutional debt limit. 41 A.D. 2d at 405,
343 N.Y.S.2d at 952. The Court of Appeals accepted the Appellate Division's view. It noted
that if unwarranted assignment of periods of probable usefulness to city operating expenses
were allowed, the constitutional limitation would be rendered meaningless. 34 N.Y.2d at 629,
311 N.E.2d at 504, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 370. Unfortunately, by the time Hurd was decided, New
York City was annually issuing hundreds of millions of dollars of capital debt to finance
expenses, FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 69. Despite the constitutional provisions, the
damage had been done.
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Capitalized expenses were the main component of the "shadow
budget. 47 Another practice employed to reduce the current expense
budget was the exclusion of certain items from the total expense
budget, notwithstanding that these items remained in the budget
of individual city departments."5 A preface to the expense budget
made reference to these items, but the dollar figures were not in-
cluded in the officially-promulgated budget. 9 These expenses were
camouflaged, resulting in an inaccurate and misleading budget
total. Importantly, these hidden expenses were, to a major extent,
accounted for by capital funds."
These practices did not go uncriticized. The Citizens Budget
Commission pointed out the desirability of full disclosure and called
for prudence in ending the practice of "borrowing to meet recurring
operating expenses.""1 Counsel for Governor Rockefeller also noted
problems in amending section 11.00 to allow current budgetary ap-
propriations to be excluded from the constitutional tax limit of a
city. "[This] may be viewed by the courts as a distortion of consti-
tutional intent." 2 Issued as a warning against the passage of the
amendments, this advice went unheeded, and amendments to sec-
tion 11.00 were continuously enacted." Thus, instead of taking the
47. See note 45 supra.
48. For example, in 1969 there was .a lump-sum deduction from the total budget, indi-
cated as follows:
Less: Capital Budget, Special and Assessment Funds; Real Property Fund; Housing
Fund; Funds from Limited Profit Housing Companies; State Aid for Urban Renewal;
State Aid and Private Funds for the Construction of Community Mental Health Cen-
ters; State Aid for Capital Projects and Sundry Income Expenditures Included in
Budget: $256,772,853.
Importantly, as the Citizens Budget Commission pointed out, "Nowhere [did] this budget
inform the public, except by intensive detailed analysis, that $157.6 million of this shadow
budget, or over sixty per cent, represent[ed] borrowing." THE SHADOW BUDGET, supra note
45, at 2.
49. THE SHADOW BUDGET, supra note 45, at 2.
50. E.g., in 1969-70 capital funds accounted for more than 60 per cent of the Shadow
Budget (approximately $158 million), Id. at 4.
51. Id. at 6.
52. SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE Crr op NEw YORK, A REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 46 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COUNSEL's REPORT]. The New York State
Constitution sets limitations on the amount which a municipal unit can raise by real estate
taxes for local purposes. The limit is expressed as a percentage of the average full valuation
of taxable real estate (e.g., 2 per cent for New York City). N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 10. See
notes 8 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
53. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
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financially prudent approach of tightening its fiscal belt, the city
chose to finance municipal services by debt financing.
The practice of using long-term borrowing to finance current oper-
ating expenses causes several harmful effects. The costs of operating
expenses are increased as a result of the interest costs incurred on
debt repayment. 5 The limit on the real estate tax which the City
may impose to finance operating expenses55 is circumvented because
the limit does not apply to the repayment of debt service obliga-
tion.5" This, in turn, results in higher real estate tax rates. 7 Finally,
the City's debt incurring power is reduced, thereby restricting the
City's power to borrow for legitimate capital improvements. 8
The Temporary Commission on New York City Finances" noted
several additional adverse effects of funding expenses through the
issuance of long-term debt, such as increased debt service costs A0
The Commission stated:
First, the city's infra-structure was inadequately maintained in part be-
cause capital funds were diverted for operating rather than capital purposes.
Second, the city's ability to borrow money for legitimate purposes at compet-
itive costs was inhibited. Third, its debt load pushed up debt service costs,
54. CBC, supra note 40, at 3.
55. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
56. See note 22, supra and accompanying text.
57. CBC, supra note 40, at 3.
58. Id. Additionally, the reduction of the City's debt-incurring power encourages the use
of public benefit corporations to finance capital construction, see notes 131-60 infra, as the
debt contracted by these corporations is not applied to the City's debt limit. CBC, supra note
40, at 3.
59. The Temporary Commission on New York City Finances is a group whose members
were appointed by Mayor Abraham Beame, to study and make recommendations concerning
the City of New York's long term financial problems and prospects.
60. Debt service is the cost of interest and principal due on outstanding debt. See note
22 supra, and accompanying text. The following table sets forth the increase in debt service
costs, dollar and percentage wise, for fiscal years 1961-1975.
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which reduced the amount of money available to deliver services."
Clearly, then, existing state constitutional provisions were
ineffective in preventing uncontrolled debt incurrence and its ad-
verse effects.2 Instead, as one report pointed out "[ilt seemed as
if the city could borrow for anything. ' 3
As current expenses were capitalized, charges were made against
the debt limit." In order to accommodate this charge the city ex-
cluded other debt from the constitutional limit figures. The method
employed to accomplish this has been referred to as the "two to ten
TABLE 3
DEBT SERVICE COSTS FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK:
FISCAL YEARS 1961-1975
($ in millions)
Percentage
Fiscal Year Debt Service Fiscal Period Increase
1961 $ 402 1961-1976 473.1%
1962 400 1961-1966 46.5
1963 400 1966-1971 40.9
1964 433 1971-1976 177.6
1965 470
1966 589
1967 672
1968 650
1969 667
1970 676
1971 830
1972 932
1973 1,598
1974 1,269
1975 1,948
FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 73.
61. FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 71.
62. See note 46 supra.
63. Committee on Municipal Affairs of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Proposals to Strengthen Local Finance Laws in New York State, 34 THE REcORD 58, 77
(Jan./Feb. 1979, No. 1/2) [hereinafter cited as Proposals].
64. It should be noted, however, that even though capital funds were used, these expendi-
tures were officially carried in the expense budget and to a large extent, obfuscated in the
"Shadow Budget." See notes 45 & 48 supra and accompanying text.
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percent debt exclusion switch." 5 Under the New York Constitu-
tion's ten percent limit on long-term debt, if the project which is
financed generates revenues that cover twenty-five percent or more
of the debt service requirements of a year (i.e., projects which are
partially self-sustaining), the long-term debt may be excluded from
the ten percent figure to the extent debt service is so covered. "
However, exclusion from the additional two percent debt limit for
housing and urban renewal projects requires that the project be
completely self-sustaining in order for the debt to be excluded from
the debt limitations. In 1968, New York City sponsored an amend-
ment to section 150.00 of the Local Finance Law which would ex-
pressly permit the "debt exclusion switch." 6 This allowed the city
to charge debt issued for housing and urban renewal purposes to the
ten percent limit where the project was only partially self-
sustaining.6" The city took advantage of the debt exclusion switch
to partially finance the Mitchell-Lama project. 0 Pursuant to the
amendment the city excluded approximately $1 billion of the $1.2
billion in Mitchell-Lama related debt in fiscal year 1975-1976. 71 Had
Mitchell-Lama debt remained chargeable only to the housing and
urban renewal two percent limit, little of that debt could have been
excluded under section 152.00 because most of the city's Mitchell-
Lama projects were not self-sustaining.72 This was exactly the type
65. SPECIAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 52, at 77.
66. N.Y. CONST. art. VIii § 5(C). The Local Finance Law specifies what debt may be
excluded from the debt limits. See N.Y. LocAL FIN. LAw § 123.00 (McKinney 1968). Before
the city can exclude any debt from its total outstanding indebtedness, the city must file an
exclusion application with the state comptroller. The state comptroller must consent to the
exclusion. Id. §§ 123.00(g)-123.00(j).
67. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIH, § 4.
68. N.Y. LoCAL FIN. LAw § 150.00(d) (McKinney Supp. 1978). This section states that the
two percent housing debt limit shall not apply "to the extent that there is a sufficient margin
of debt contracting power to cover indebtedness for housing . . . purposes contracted pur-
suant to article eighteen of the constitution within the debt limit established by section four
of article eight of the constitution" unless the finance board decides to charge the debt or
any part of it to the two percent limit. Id. § 150.00(d)(ii). The rationale for this amendment
was the distinction made between the constitutional power to incur debt and the debt limit
to which it may be charged.
69. Id.
70. See note 117 infra.
71. [1975-19761 ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 18, at 143.
72. "Fully 66 city Mitchell-Lama projects-two out of three in the entire portfolio-could
meet only their operating expenses. They had insufficient funds to pay debt service, reserve
1979]
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of debt that the two percent limit was designed to regulate. How-
ever, by charging the debt against the ten percent category, these
issues would be subject to more liberal exclusion provisions.7" Va-
cancies were then created for other debt, specifically debt misused
for operating expenses. Obviously, this transfer between debt limits
resulted in a substantial amplification of the city's borrowing
power.
II. Short-term Debt Financing Devices
A. Reserve Funds and Budget Notes
The city's short-term borrowing power was also utilized to gener-
ate funds which would otherwise have been unavailable to the city.
In contrast to long-term borrowing, short-term borrowing may pro-
perly be used to finance current expenses. The cash flow of expected
revenues often do not meet current expense requirements. For ex-
ample, taxes may not be paid until the close of the fiscal year.
Borrowing is then necessary to meet such cash-flow problems. How-
ever, this power was also abused.
An example of abuse was the annual depletion of legally-created
reserve funds, one of which is termed the "rainy day fund."74 This
fund was designed to provide the city with a source of cash in times
of deficient tax collections. 5 The City Charter originally obligated
requirements, and returns on equity." D. MUCHNICK, FINANCIAL REALITY IN PUBLICLY ASSISTED
MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING 17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MUCHNICKI.
Since most of the Mitchell-Lama projects could not pay debt service requirements, it is
difficult to imagine how the city could obtain any exclusion of Mitchell-Lama debt. The
"exclusion applications" prepared by the city (N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 123.00(h) (McKinney
1968)) were unavailable at the time of this writing notwithstanding the fact that these exclu-
sion applications are public records to be kept on file in the office of the City's chief fiscal
officer. Id. § 123.00(j). The exclusion applications should contain the mathematics involved
in determining if the city qualified for a debt exclusion. At this time, one can only assume
that the exclusion was not sought on a project by project basis. The city must have treated
all the projects as one for exclusion purposes, In this way, the surplus revenue generated by
productive projects would make up for less productive projects.
73. Id. § 152.00(b). The facility with which this switching was accomplished is exempli-
fied by testimony given to the SEC's staff by Steven Clifford, Special Deputy Comptroller.
"Q: What types of housing debt are discharged against the two percent limitation? A: I don't
know. They used to transfer things back and forth between the ten and the two. I never
understood it." SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
74. The fund is officially titled the "Tax Appropriation and General Fund Stabilization
Reserve Fund." N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 6, § 128 (1976).
75. Id.
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the city to appropriate sufficient money to maintain the reserve
fund's prescribed level." In 1963, however, an amendment to the
City Charter was passed which relieved the city of this obligation."
As a result, between 1961 and 1965 the fund's reserve decreased from
$70 million to $155 thousand.78 There were similar depletions of
other reserve funds (e.g., the tax deficiency account).79
A second practice employed to meet cash flow needs was the
issuance of budget notes. Budget notes were payable from the suc-
ceeding years' budgets .8  The authority to issue these notes was
conferred to bridge a current budget gap. However, this authority
was also abused. In fiscal years 1962 through 1965, the City of New
York issued budget notes in the amounts of $10, $27, $30 and $39
million, respectively.81
B. Revenue Anticipation Notes
To meet continuing budget requirements, the legislature provided
for the issuance of "revenue anticipation notes" (hereinafter
"RANs"). s2 These were notes issued in expectation of certain tax
revenues (e.g., state aid for education, local non-property taxes,
etc.)8 3 connected with activities occurring in April, May, and June
of the current year, but not scheduled for payment until the subse-
quent year.84 The funds received from the sale of RANs allowed the
city to balance the current year's budget with the estimated reve-
76. Id.
77. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 6, § 128g (1979).
78. Proposals, supra note 63, at 75.
79. Id. § 127 (1976). See also TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON CITY FINANCES, FINAL REPORT,
BETTER FINANCING FOR NEW YORK CITY 57, table 3 (1966).
80. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 29.00(0), 29.00(k) (McKinney 1968).
81. Proposals, supra note 63, at 76. Robertson, Going Broke the New York Way, FORTUNE,
Aug., 1975, at 146-47. Limitations on the amount of budget notes are enumerated in N.Y.
LOCAL FIN. LAW § 29.00(a)(2) (McKinney 1968). In 1965 Mayor Wagner authorized the sale
of these notes in excess of legal limits. See note 2 supra.
82. 1965 N.Y. Laws ch. 441 (codified at N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 25.00(c)(2) (McKinney
1968)).
83. [1974-1975] NEW YORK CITY COMPrROL ER'S ANN. REP. pt. 6-C (Temporary Debt.).
84. Proposals, supra note 63, at 76. "Such borrowing was limited to the difference be-
tween the amount of the specific type of revenue estimated by the City and the amount
actually collected at the time of issuance of the notes." SPECIAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note
52, at 54.
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nues of the following year. 5 RANs were a desirable fiscal device
because they provided for an increase in current revenues without
violating the debt limitations imposed by article VIII, as short-term
debt is expressly exempted from the debt limitations of that arti-
cle." As one might predict, the amount of outstanding RANs stead-
ily increased as the city regularly took great advantage of this au-
thority.11 As one critic warned, the authorization of the issuance of
RANs was the "institutionalizing" of a "bad budgeting proce-
dure.""8
The amendment discussed above which relieved the city of its
obligation to maintain the reserve funds"5 also allowed RANs to be
issued based on estimated revenues rather than actual revenues
collected or received during the preceding fiscal year, as had been
previously required10 Debt was then issued upon the basis of poten-
85. SPECIAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 52, at 53.
86. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
87. The following table shows the almost six-fold increase in RANs outstanding between
1965 and 1974, redeemable from general fund revenues:
TABLE 4
RANs OUTSTANDING
Redeemable from general fund revenues
As of June 30 Millions
1965 $ 56.6
1966 45.0
1967 93.8
1968 93.8
1969 93.8
1970 116.7
1971 131.3
1972 150.0
1973 162.1
1974 298.3
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, ch. 2, at 12.
88. SPECIAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 52, at 54 (Senator Marchi).
89. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text.
90. Prior to the amendment to the City Charter, if $500 million in revenue had been
received as of the end of year one, and $400 million had been received by the end of year two,
outstanding RANs could not exceed $100 million. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 20.
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tially inflated income estimates, without any assurance that the
money would be available to meet the additional debt service re-
quirements. In essence, RANs were issued based on insufficient or
non-existent revenues. A 1975 audit report on the city, prepared by
the Office of the New York State Comptroller noted that "the
city had included as accounts receivable substantial amounts that
were not collectable or where the likelihood of collection was ex-
tremely remote-such as claims for reimbursement of disallowed
costs, claims in excess of stipulated limitations, and claims that
had been rejected but were on appeal." 9' The Office also observed
that "the significant overstatements of receivables . . . meant that
revenue anticipation notes issued by the city and which were stated
to be supported by federal and state receivables were not so sup-
ported."" When these budgeted revenues did not materialize, new
notes were issued to pay off old, resulting in a cumulative deficit.
This practice of reissuing notes after their maturity date, result-
ing, in effect, in an extension of the maturity' date of the original
issue, is known as "rolling-over."93 Short-term notes effectively cre-
ated a long-term debt. This "long-term debt", however, was not
controlled by the relevant constitutional restrictions. As expected,
due to fiscal expediencies, this procedure became an important and
often-used financing device. 4
The situation was worsened by an additional amendment to the
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id. at 25.
93. "Roll-over" refers to the issuance of new debt to pay the principal and interest on
previously issued notes as they mature. It is simply the replacement of old with new debt
and, therefore, does not reduce the amount of principal.
94. The following table indicates the increase in the roll-over problem during fiscal years
1961-1975. Whenever new issues of notes equal redemptions, outstanding debt remains the
same, the city having rolled-over the entire amount.
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Local Finance Law in 1971.15 This amendment permitted the issu-
ance of RANs based on revenues receivable from federal and state
governments on an overall basis." These revenues were aggregated
for the issuance of the RANs, whether or not these funds were ear-
marked for definite categorical purposes (i.e., capital or opera-
tional). Consequently, "it [was] almost impossible to deterine ex-
actly how the proceeds of these obligations were utilized." 7
C. Tax Anticipation Notes
Because short-term debt coupled with the rolling-over practice
was such an effective fiscal device, it was employed in several other
forms. In addition to the RANs, the city also issued tax anticipation
notes (hereinafter "TANs")."8 These notes are short-term obliga-
TABLE 5
SHORT-TERM DEBT OF NEW YORK CITY:
FISCAL YEARS 1961-1975
Increase
(Decrease) Notes
Fiscal Redeemed or In Amount Issued/
Year Issued Cancelled Outstanding Redeemed
1961 $ 687,700,000 $ 685,700,000 $ 2,000,000 1.0029
1962 842,238,000 815,138,000 27,100,000 1.0331
1963 807,658,800 704,300,000 105,358,800 1.1463
1964 1,166,728,800 1,081,758,800 84,970,000 1,0786
1965 1,469,989,800 1,260,128,800 209,861,000 1.1658
1966 1,645,597,560 1,704,539,800 (58,942,240) 0.9653
1967 2,076,036,800 1,907,855,360 168,151,440 1.0886
1968 2,427,717,000 2,369,399,000 58,318,000 1.0244
1969 3,270,995,000 3,216,957,000 54,038,000 1.0167
1970 4,400,925,000 3,860,005,000 540,920,000 1.1398
1971 6,512,240,000 5,481,060,000 1,031,180,000 1.1881
1972 5,248,960,000 4,918,110,000 330,850,000 1.0673
1973 4,003,285,000 4,135,980,000 (132,695,000) 0.9678
1974 7,305,915,000 6,407,550,000 898,365,000 1.1403
1975 8,395,745,000 7,271,445,000 1,124,300,000 1.1547
FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 71.
95. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 25.00(b)(2) (McKinney 1978).
96. Id.
97. SPECIAL COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 52, at 59.
98. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 24.00 (McKinney 1968).
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tions issued in anticipation of real estate tax revenues. Expense
budgets were based on full collection of these revenues. However,
the figures used occasionally did not reflect actual incoming funds. 0
For example, in 1975, the Annual Report of the Comptroller listed
real estate taxes receivable in an amount of $502.2 million.i0 Based
on this figure, the city had outstanding TANs of $380 million.',
However, much of the taxes receivable included receivables which
represented tax-exempt property. Such ' property included publicly-
owned property ($126.6 million), diplomatic property ($4.7 million),
Mitchell-Lama property ($53.0 million), 0 ' "in rem" property ($54.4
99. The following table illustrates the figures for accrued real estate taxes receivable
which were used by the city as support for the issuance of TANs:
TABLE 6
NEW YORK CITY TAX ANTICIPATION NOTES:
FISCAL YEARS 1963-1975
($ in millions)
Taxes Receivable
As of June 30 TANs Outstanding per Annual Report
1963 $ 63.1 $ 94.2
1964 77.4 104.7
1965 88.8 115.9
1966 100.3 130.3
1967 136.5 168.8
1968 147.5 176.4
1969 155.5 187.5
1970 170.0 204.9
1971 206.0 241.9
1972 232.0 282.8
1973 265.0 337.5
1974 317.0 408.5
1975 380.0 502.2
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
However, in an August, 1975 audit report, the Office of the State Comptroller considered
over eighty per cent of the taxes receivable to be unavailable to the city. 11974-1975] NEW
YORK STATE COMPTROLLER AUDIT REP. No. NYC-26-76, at 4.
100. [1974-1975] NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER'S ANN. REP. Part 1-Consolidated State-
ments-Summary 2.
101. [1974-1975] NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER'S ANN. REP. Part 6-C-Temporary
Debt-Statement 1.
102. Mitchell-Lama properties are properties which are legally permitted to apply for
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million)," 3 and property belonging to Penn Central, a bankrupt cor-
poration ($43.9 million)."' Moreover, the city did not realistically
account for taxes which, although due, were not collected because
of defaulting taxpayers, cancellations or remissions. 0 s State audi-
tors estimated these uncollectibles to be $125.7 million in 1975.1"1
Therefore, receivables attributable to these two categories
amounted to over $408 million, or eighty-one percent of the total
figure used to support TAN issuance. As the State Comptroller's
Office succinctly observed: "The City's budgetary and accounting
practices result[ed] in an inflated estimate of real estate taxes to
be collected to balance the annual expense budget, and [did] not
make adequate provision for taxes that [would] not be collected.
The result [was] that budgeted real estate tax amounts [were] not
.. .realized .. ".. ,107 The same office noted further that "for the
most part, the revenue shortfall was met by continued borrow-
ing."'18 Hence, deficit expansion was greatly intensified through the
misuse of TANs.
The State Local Finance Law expressly provides for rolling-over
of TANs for a four year period following the maturity date of the
original issuance.'"1 The rollover is allowed on the theory that these
taxes may be collected during this period, and so, in order to use
these assets prior to collection, the notes are reissued. As the Munic-
ipal Finance Commission to the Governor explained, the four year
limit is imposed because "[s]uch taxes outstanding and uncol-
lected after the termination of such [four year] period are assets
of doubtful value and consequently the notes issued in anticipation
of their collection should be redeemed no later than the termination
"shelter rent exemptions" which amount to abatements of real estate taxes. SEC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 6, at 31 n.2. See also note 117 infra.
103. Property classified as "in rem" is that which, because of non-payment of real estate
taxes, is in the process of being foreclosed. S.E.C. STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 31 n.2.
104. Id. at 32.
105. Proposals, supra note 63, at 77.
106. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 32.
107. [1974-19751 NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER AUDIT REP. No. NYC-26-76, at 4.
108. Id.
109. The statute, in relevant part, reads: "Tax anticipation notes issued pursuant to this
paragraph shall mature within one year from the date of their issuance and may be renewed
from time to time." The statute adds that each renewal shall be for a period not to exceed
the close of the fourth fiscal year succeeding that in which the original notes were issued. N.Y.
LOCAL FIN. LAW § 24.00(a)(6) (McKinney 1968) (emphasis added).
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of such period.""'
Since original estimates of real estate tax receivables were so
unrealistic and inaccurate, the roll-over allowance aggravated the
situation. Conveniently, the city could use the legal roll-over in
order to meet its TAN debt service needs, unsatisfied by the over-
estimations allegedly supporting them. Coupled with the misuse of
RANs, huge deficits were incurred.
D. Bond Anticipation Notes
Bond anticipation notes (BANs) are another short-term borrow-
ing device used excessively by the city prior to the fiscal crisis of
1975. BANs are sold to provide a temporary source of revenue in
anticipation of a subsequent sale of long-term municipal bonds.'
Generally, a municipality sells bonds to generate the money-needed
to finance capital projects such as the construction or rehabilitation
of schools, public buildings, sewers and housing."2 Municipalities
often issue BANs to finance the early stages of a capital project until
bonds are sold, at which time the project is said to be in
"permanent" financing."' The proceeds of the bond sale are then
used to redeem the previously issued BANs. 41.
110. [1942] Note of Municipal Finance Commission, N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 24.00
(McKinney 1969).
111. STEISS, supra note 7, at 184.
112. [1975-19761 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 18, at 140-41. See notes 6 & 7 supra and
accompanying text.
113. STEiss, supra note 7, at 184.
114. Id. At the time the financial market rejected city bonds and notes, BANs accounted
form more than one quarter of the city's outstanding short-term debt, as illustrated by the
following table.
TABLE 7
NEW YORK CITY SHORT-TERM DEBT AS OF JUNE 30, 1975
($ in millions)
Type of Note Amount
Budget Notes
Tax Anticipation Notes 380
Revenue Anticipation Notes 2,560
Bond Anticipation Notes 1,570
Urban Renewal Notes 30
Total Short-Term 4,540
[1976] MAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
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The issuance of BANs is a fiscally prudent part of the financial
management of capital projects when properly used. A municiaplity
can finance a capital project in phases by relying on BANs for tem-
porary financing. "This procedure has the advantages of avoiding
interest payments on the full amount of funding until it is actually
required, of avoiding the accumulation of idle funds, and of greater
flexibility in choosing the most advantageous time to market long-
term bonds.""' However, as with the budget practices discussed
above,"' BANs were abused.
A typical practice was the use of BANs to finance the Mitchell-
Lama project.'17 The city rolled-over"8 its BANs as they matured,
continually renewing the debt without paying any principal. Had
the city issued bonds for Mitchell-Lama projects, the city's annual
debt service would have included the payment of both principal and
interest."' Consequently, by rolling-over its Mitchell-Lama BANs,
115. STEISS, supra note 7, at 184.
116. See notes 74-115 supra and accompanying text.
117. In 1955, the New York State Legislature enacted the Limited-Profit Housing Compa-
nies Law, now commonly known as the Mitchell-Lama Act. Mitchell-Lama refers to the two
state legislators who sponsored the N.Y. Paw. Hous. FIN. LAW art. I (McKinney 1976); see
Wall St. J., July 21, 1978, at 1, col. 1. The New York City Mitchell-Lama program is super-
vised by the Housing Development Administration (HDA) according to policies determined
by the State Legislature and the City Council. ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF NEW
YORK CITY, INC., CONSULTANT'S REPORT TO NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT ADMIN-
ISTRATION, ON IMPROVING MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING SUPERVISION 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
CONSULTANT'S REPORT]. The .purpose of the law was to promote the construction of safe and
sanitary housing for people of modest means. N.Y. Prav. Hous. FIN. LAw art. II, § 11 (McKin-
ney 1976). The Mitchell-Lama Act offered New York City a solution to the migration of
middle-class families to the surrounding suburbs. Id. § 11-a(2).
To accomplish its purpose, the Mitchell-Lama Act attempted to induce private housing
developers to enter into business arrangements they would normally avoid. Id. § 11. This
section states that inadequate housing conditions in municipalities requires "speedy relief
which cannot readily be provided by the ordinary unaided operation of private enterprise
.... .Naturally. this required the creation of business incentives in a construction market
where none had previously existed. These incentives were provided by the State and City
governments which were authorized to offer low-interest, long-term mortgage loans and real
estate tax abatements to housing companies organized pursuant to the Mitchell-Lama Act.
J. DESALVO, NEW YORK CITY's MITCHELL-LAMA HOUSING PROGRAM 2 (1971). In return for these
benefits, the housing companies accepted governmental regulation of construction, profits,
dividends, rent structure and tenant selection. Id.
118. See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
119. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 21.00(f) (McKinney 1968). This section allows the City to
issue serial bonds to finance middle-income housing. These bonds may be retired by making
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the city's annual debt service for Mitchell-Lama debt only included
the payment of interest on BANs. Therefore, the city's debt service
for its Mitchell-Lama projects was kept as low as possible; the lower
the debt service, the greater the possible exclusion under section
123.00.120
The city needed to roll-over its BANs in order to avail itself of
the debt exclusion provided by section 123.00. This practice of con-
tinuing to roll-over BANs, however, could not have occurred without
the aid of the New York State Legislature. Local Finance Law,
section 23.00, requires that BANs issued to make loans to limited-
profit housing companies "or the renewals of such notes, may ex-
tend not more than five years beyond the original date of issue of
such notes." 2' In 1966, the city sponsored legislation to extend the
maximum renewal period of BANs. In that year, the state legisla-
ture amended section 23.00 to extend the renewal period of BANs
issued in 1961 to six years.'2 Similar amendments were enacted
yearly from 1968 to 1976.123
The legislative memorandum filed in support of the 1971 amend-
ment requested that the renewal period of BANs be extended be-
cause of the high interest rate on long-term borrowing. 2 ' The memo-
randum emphasized the relation between "interest payable on per-
manent bonds" and the "rent levels at the affected projects."' 2
approximately equal annual payments of principal and interest over the period for which the
bonds are issued. Id. § 21.00(f)(2).
120. See note 66 supra.
121. N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 23.00(b) (McKinney 1968).
122. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 205.
123. 1968 N.Y. Laws ch. 135; 1969 N.Y. Laws ch. 168; 1970 N.Y. Laws ch. 4; 1971 N.Y.
Laws ch. 4, 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 202; 1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 645; 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 885; 1975
N.Y. Laws ch. 367; 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 64; Section 23.00(b) was also amended in 1978. 1978
N.Y. Laws ch. 167. The renewal period of BANs issued before 1965 was extended to 16 years.
Id. The ease with which the city was able to convince the state legislature to amend existing
statutory requirements, rather than comply with those requirements, is evident from the
frequent amendments passed to the Local Finance Law.
124. 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 4 at 2342.
125. Id.
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Because the Mitchell-Lama program was intended to be self-
sustaining, 2 the cost of financing the program was to come from the
rents paid by Mitchell-Lama tenants.'27 Therefore, an increase in
the cost of borrowing would theoretically require a corresponding
increase in rents. 2 ' The rent structure at most Mitchell-Lama pro-
jects, however, was at no time high enough to make the program
self-sustaining.'29 The city rolled-over its Mitchell-Lama BANs to
avail itself of the debt exclusion provided by the Local Finance Law
and to avoid imposing sustantial rent increases upon Mitchell-
Lama tenants. As a result, the city did not amortize its Mitchell-
Lama debt and the burden of paying for the program has been
shifted to future generations.
III. Public Benefit Corporations
Public authorities, or public benefit corporations (PBCs), are sep-
arate legal entities'30 created by the legislature 3' in order to promote
126. CONSULTANT'S REPORT, supra note 117, at 5.
127. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 31(1)(a) (McKinney 1976).
128. CONSULTANT'S REPORT, supra note 117, at 8.
129. Based on data available in 1975, one study estimates that 66 out of 101 Mitchell-
Lama projects had average monthly deficits of approximately $45 per rental unit. MUCHNICK,
supra note 72, at 17.
One reason the rent structure was inadequate relates to the purpose of the Mitchell-Lama
Act. Since the housing projects were designed to aid people of modest means, rents had to
remain at a level tenants could afford. See note 117 supra. Another reason is that rent in-
creases have never been in the political interest of elected officials answerable to a large,
mostly tenant constituency. One need only recall the Co-op City rent strike to appreciate
the political clout of angry, organized Mitchell-Lama tenants. Co-op City is part of New
York State's Mitchell-Lama program. In 1975, state officials attempted to impose a 25%
increase in carrying charges (the monthly fee paid by tenants residing in cooperative apart-
ments). Sixty thousand Co-op City residents opposed the increase and began a rent strike
that lasted 13 months. Finally, the state dropped its plan to impose at 25% increase. Wall
St. J., July 21, 1978, at 23, col. 1.
130. "[Plublic corporations are independent and autonomous, deliberately designed to
be able to function with a freedom and flexibility not permitted to an ordinary State board,
department or commission." Plumbing Ass'n v. New York State Thruway Auth., 5 N.Y.2d
420, 423, 158 N.E.2d 238, 239, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (1959). See also Smith v. Levitt, 37
A.D.2d 418, 421, 326 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (3d Dep't 1971); Story House Corp. v. New York Job
Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, 325 N.Y.S.2d 659 (3d Dep't 1971); In re Dormitory Auth. (Span
Elec.), 18 N.Y.2d 114, 218 N.E.2d 693, 271 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1966); Braun v. State, 203 Misc.
563, 117 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
Public Benefit Corporations (PBCs) and Public Authorities are terms that are used inter-
changeably, and will be so used throughout this article.
131. Legislative authority for the creation of Public Benefit Corporations is found in the
New York State Constitution article X, section 5. The constitutional provision requires that
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a governmental purpose. 3 ' In the New York Public Authorities Law,
the New York State Legislature has classified the PBCs into general
categories embracing such diverse governmental purposes as con-
structing and maintaining parks, highways, bridges and tunnels,
markets, public utilities, ports, and parking facilities.'33
The legislature defines a public benefit corporation as a body or
authority possessing characteristics of both corporations and bodies
politic.'34 Unlike private corporations incorporated under the New
York State Business Corporation Law, the corporate powers of a
public authority are restricted to the specific types of business activ-
public corporations be created only by special act of the legislature. This provision has been
construed to mean that a public corporation must be created by the state legislature itself,
rather than by local government or an administrative officer. City of Rye v. Metro. Transp.
Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 627, 634, 249 N.E.2d 429, 432, 301 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-73 (1969).
132. The authorities are governmental in scope since the projects developed and services
provided are all matters of state concern intended to benefit the people of the State. See note
133 infra and accompanying text.
133. Examples include the Bethpage Park Authority, N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 200-214
(McKinney 1970); New York State Thruway Authority, id. §§ 350-375; Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority, id. §§ 550-571; New York State Bridge Authority, id. 99 525-542;
Central New York Regional Market Authority, id. §§ 825-845; Power Authority of the State
of New York, id. §§ 1000-1016; Buffalo Sewer Authority, id. §§ 1175-1195. PBCs have also
undertaken to build and operate a planetarium at the American Museum of Natural History,
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1625-1639 (McKinney 1970) (American Museum of Natural History
Planetarium Authority); to research and develop the use of atomic energy, id. §§ 1850-1870
(N.Y.S. Energy Research and Development Authority); to improve employment opportuni-
ties, id. §§ 1800-1834 (New York Job Development Authority); to provide financing, e.g. N.Y.
PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 40-61 (McKinney 1976) (New York State Housing Finance Agency),
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 7411-7431 (McKinney 1979) (New York State Medical Care Facili-
ties Finance Agency Act); to construct housing and other facilities, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW
99 1675-1692 (McKinney 1970) (Dormitory Authority); to support cultural institutions, N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 325-331 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (Trust for Cultural Resources for the City
of New York).
Typically, since the public authority is serving a public purpose, the property and income
of the authority and the interest on its bonds are tax-exempt. Comm'r v. White's Estate, 144
F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944). Tax exemptions may be granted only by general law and in the case
of public authorities this legislative-granted tax exemption is repealable. N.Y. CONST. art.
XVI, § 1. See Comment, An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 1376, 1383-85 (1973); Quirk & Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities
Commonly Known as Authorities, 56 CORNELL L. REy. 521, 578-81 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Quirk & Wein].
134. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 202 (McKinney 1979) (Bethpage Park Authority);
id. § 352 (New York State Thruway Authority); id. § 1263 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (Metropol-
itan Transportation Authority); id. § 1282 (New York State Environmental Facilities Corpo-
ration).
208 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
ity granted by the statutes creating them.'35 Members of the boards
of directors of statewide or regional public authorities are appointed
by the Governor with the consent of the senate.'38 The legislature
has also mandated that some of these board members must hold
high office in the state government (ex officio directors).'37 The
legislative objective is to provide the authority with information on
state programs and, if possible, to coordinate activities. In sum, the
board members are to serve as liaisons to the state administra-
tion.' 31
The projects traditionally financed by public authorities were
revenue-producing' 3 facilities or service facilities for which there
was a charge or fee."10 The projects were therefore self-sustaining and
the bonds sold to finance them were secured by the projects' own
revenues.'' More recently, however, public authorities have begun
135. Among the usual corporate powers conferred upon a public authority are the powers
to sue and be sued, possess a corporate seal, acquire, sell, or dispose of real and personal
property, make by-laws, fix rates and collect fees or tolls for the use of its facilities (so called
"user charges"), and make contracts, borrow money and issue evidences of indebtedness.
E.g., Metropolitan Transportation Authority, N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1265-1266 (McKinney
1970 & Supp. 1978); Dormitory Authority, id. § 1678; Nassau County Bridge Authority, id. §
654. In addition, some public authorities have been empowered to condemn property, e.g.,
Nassau County Bridge Authority, id.; Dormitory Authority, id. § 1678; Erie County Water
Authority, id. § 1054 (McKinney 1970); Trust for Cultural Resources of the City of New York,
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 329 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
136. There are 42 statewide or regional authorities in which the Governor participates in
the appointing of members to the authority boards. For a complete listing, see N.Y. DEP'T OF
AUDIT AND CONTROL, 1978 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER 38 [hereinafter cited as 1978
AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT].
137. Examples include the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, N.Y. PuB. AUrrH.
LAW § 552 (McKinney 1970) (Members of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority to serve ex officio on the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority) and
the Central New York Regional Market Authority, id. § 827 (Commissioner of agriculture and
markets to serve as member ex officio).
138. But see MORELAND ACT COMMISSION, RESTORING CREDIT AND CONFIDENCE, A REFORM
PROGRAM FOR NEW YORK STATE AND ITS PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 62-63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
MORELAND REPORT] where the authors recommend that the statewide public authorities
should have no ex officio directors.
139. Revenue-producing facilities operated by authorities include ports (Port of Oswego
Authority, N.Y. Pus. AUTH. LAW §§ 1350-1370 (McKinney 1970), dams (Power Authority of
the State of New York, id. H§ 1000-1016), airports (Ogdensburg Port Authority, id. § 1379),
and parks (Bethpage Park Authority, id. §§ 200-214).
140. Services rendered include water (Suffolk County Water Authority, N.Y. PUB. AutH.
LAW § 1075-1092 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979)), gas and electric power (Albany Light,
Heat and Power Authority, id. §§ 1025-1044) and transportation (Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority, id. §§ 1260-1278).
141. 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 35; XI NEw YORK STATE
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to finance projects which are not self-sustaining,'42 such as the State
University' and mental hygiene facilities. " Public authorities
have also been organized to provide financing to New York City,"'
as well as to other public benefit corporations.'"
Article VII, section 11 of the constitution provides that long-term
debt of the state may be incurred only if the legislature authorizes
it by law for some single purpose, and only if the law is approved
by a majority of the people voting at a general election.'47 Such debt
carries the full faith and credit of the state,'" backed by its general
taxing power.'" On the other hand, PBCs, as separate legal entities,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT: PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE AND LOCAL
GOV'T 239-40 (1938).
142. 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 35.
143. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1675-1692 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978) (Dormi-
tory Authority).
144. See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 4401-4417, (McKinney 1979) (Facilities Develop-
ment Corporation Act); id. §§ 7411-7431 (New York State Medical Care Facilities Finance
Agency Act).
145. E.g., Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York, N.Y. PUB. AUTH.
LAW §§ 3030-3040 (McKinney Supp. 1978). On the subject of New York City's fiscal crisis
and the creation of MAC see Comment, New York-A City in Crisis: Fiscal Emergency
Legislation and the Constitutional Attacks, 6 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 65, 68 (1977). See also notes
222-87 infra.
146. In February, 1975, the New York State Project Finance Agency (PFA), N.Y. UNCON-
SOL. LAW §§ 6361-6382 (McKinney 1979), was created by the legislature to provide long-term
financing to the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), id. §§.6251-6285. Formed in 1968,
the UDC was created to undertake urban development activities covering such wide and
diverse activities as the construction or improvement of industrial, manufacturing, commer-
cial, educational, recreational and cultural facilities and housing accommodations for fami-
lies of low income. Id. § 6252. By January 1975, UDC was facing financial collapse. A bond
anticipation note issue of $104.5 million was due on February 25th, and approximately $370
million was needed to complete the 20,000 housing units already under construction. In
February, the UDC defaulted on its notes and the PFA was created "[iJn order to assist in
the completion of projects to which the corporation [UDC] is contractually obligated, to
provide for the orderly marketing of obligations to finance such completion, and to provide
for the orderly payment of debt service of the corporation.... "Id. § 6362. The PFA was to
acquire funds from appropriations by the State and from the sale of its notes and bonds. Id.
In the 1975-76 fiscal year, the Legislature appropriated $198 million to PFA. State of New
York, Official Statement Relating to $40,920,000 Serial Bonds of the State of New York, Oct.
17, 1978, at 22 [hereinafter cited as Official Statement], 1978 AUTrr AND CONTROL, Annual
Report, supra note 136, at 28. The story of the UDC from its creation to its collapse is found
in MORELAND REPORT, supra note 138, at 102-282.
147. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
148. Full faith and credit debt is the-State's direct, or guaranteed, debt.
149. Should the legislature not appropriate monies for debt service payments, the Consti-
tution requires the comptroller to set aside from the first revenues of the General Fund (i.e.
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need not fulfill the requirements of the constitution in order to issue
bonds. 150 Nor are their bonds backed by the state's taxing power.,5
Public authorities have thus proliferated'52 because of the freedom
they enjoy from the constitutional restraints on the issuance of debt.
The amount of money borrowed by PBCs has been increasingly
greater than thatborrowed by the state.'53 As of 1977, New York
State public authorities had $15 billion in outstanding debt 4 as
opposed to the state's full faith and credit debt which totalled $3.7
billion.'55 Thus, the state's "nonguaranteed debt"'56 was approxi-
mately four times greater than its guarantee full faith and credit
debt.5 7
the State treasury, see note 165, infra.), a sum sufficient to meet these payments. N.Y. CONST.
art. VII, § 16.
150. N.Y. CONST.'arts. VII & VIII.
151. Both the New York Constitution and virtually all of the legislative acts creating the
authorities disclaim any liability of the state on authority debt. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8(1);
see also N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1269 (McKinney 1970) (Metropolitan Transportation
Authority).
152. N.Y.S. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER'S STUDIES ON
ISSUES OF PUBLIC FINANCE: DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 2 (Study No.
2, Jan. 1973)[hereinafter cited as DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S.].
Apparently, the Port of New York Authority, now known as the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6401-7171 (McKinney 1979) was the first authority
created in NewYork. 1921 N.Y. Laws ch. 154. By 1974 over 200 authorities had been created
by the New York State legislature. A. WALSH, THE PUBLIC'S BUSINESS 5 (1978).
153. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 2.
154. 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 37.
155. Id. at 25.
156. "Nonguaranteed" state debt is debt incurred by public authorities. The U.S. Census
Bureau defines this "nonguaranteed" state debt as:
long-term debt payable solely from pledged specific revenue producing activities (uni-
versity and college dormitories, toll highways and bridges, electric power projects,
public building and school building authorities, etc.) or from specific non-property
taxes includes only debt that does not constitute an obligation against any other
resources of the State if the pledged sources are insufficient.
1 N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, STATEWIDE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: A FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 3 (study no. 1, 1972).
157. The following table shows the trend in the State's outstanding voter approved Full
Faith and Credit debt and the bonds and notes outstanding of the 42 Statewide or regional
authorities:
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Despite constitutional' and legislative"' provisions disclaiming
the state's liability for public authorities' obligations, various fi-
nancing arrangements have been devised by which the state has, in
fact, committed its financial resources. Generally, these financial
arrangements fall into two main categories: (1) lease-purchase
agreements and (2) "moral obligation" commitments.
A. Lease Purchase Agreements
Under a lease-purchase agreement, the PBC agrees with the
state' 8 to finance, 6' and sometimes construct, a capital improve-
TABLE 8
FULL FAITH and
NONGUARANTEED CREDIT STATE
AUTHORITY DEBT] DEBT 2
($ in millions)
1972 10,589- 3,362.2
1973 12,057 3,451.3
1974 13,254 3,448.4
1975 14,150 3,508.9
1976 14,935 3,641.4
1977 15,284 3,706.1
1978 - 3,698.5
1. Based on Fiscal Years ended in the indicated calendar years.
2. Based on the fiscal year ending March 31st.
3. N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER 36 (1977).
1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 25, 37.
158. Art. X, § 5 of the New York State Constitution provides that:
[n]either the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall at any time be liable
for the payment of any, obligations issued by . . . a public corporation heretofore or
hereafter created, nor may the legislature accept, authorize acceptance of or impose
such liability upon the state or any political subdivision thereof; but the state or a
political subdivision thereof may, if authorized by the legislature, acquire the proper-
ties of any such corporation and pay the indebtedness thereof.
159. Typically, the provision in the legislative acts provides that "[tihe bonds and notes
shall not be a debt of the state of New York nor shall the state be liable thereon and such
bonds and notes shall contain on the face thereof a statement to that effect." See, e.g., N.Y.
Pus. AuTH. LAW § 1866 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1978) (New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority).
160.' Sometimes the state enters into a long-term contract with a retirement system or
with a municipality. A municipality will issue its own bonds to finance the capital improve-
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ment or facility needed by the state. The authority issues the bonds
and uses the proceeds to finance the construction of the needed
facility. The state, as owner of the land, contracts to: (1)'convey or
lease the land to the public benefit corporation, (2) be reimbursed
from bond proceeds for any "first instance""'2 appropriations, and
most importantly, (3) pay rentals high enough to provide for the
debt service due on the authority's bonds.6 3 At the completion of
the contract or at the end of the lease term, title to the land is
transferred back to the state for little or no consideration."'4
The rental or lease payments made by the state are derived from
revenues received through taxes, fees, or earmarked revenues which
would otherwise have gone into the state's general fund."' The
state thereby becomes involved in long-term "debt-like commit-
ments" to build public-purpose facilities without the requisite voter
approval.'66 Although the lease payments are not full faith and
credit state debt, it is ultimately the state's credit which secures
the authority's bonds.'67
ment, while the retirement system will invest its reserve funds. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF
N.Y.S., supra note 153, at 17.
161. The PBC often enters into a contract with another PBC to provide the financing
instead of financing the construction by issuing its own bonds. See note 168 infra.
162. For an explanation of "first instance" appropriations or advances see notes 204-09
infra and accompanying text.
163. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF NY.S., supra note 152, at 14-24.
164. Id. See also Official Statement, supra note 146, at 13; 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 27-28, DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, STATEWIDE PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES: A FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 13 (Study No. 1, Vol. 1, 1972); Quirk & Wein,
supra note 133, at 593-96; Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authori-
ties: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958); Magnusson,
Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations as a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 377 (1957).
165. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 14. The state's general fund
receives virtually all its revenue from taxes and certain other miscellaneous revenue items.
It is the most significant of the funds administrated within the state treasury. (There are
approximately 175 other funds within the state treasury). The General Fund is divided into
3 separate funds: the Local Assistance Fund (assists municipalities and school districts), the
State Purpose Fund (covers expenses of operating the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive
branches of government), and the Capital Construction Fund (covers cost of highways, park-
ways, lease-rental payments, etc.). Furthermore, "first instance" appropriations are dis-
bursed from the General Fund. For an explanation of "first instance" appropriations, see
notes 204-09, infra and accompanying text.
166. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 14. See text accompanying
notes 147-50 supra.
167. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 14. As the building authority
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Lease-purchase agreements have been used to finance a variety
of projects: State University and mental hygiene facilities; 6 ' health
and correctional facilities;'"9 the reconstruction and the repair of
state highways; 70 and the construction of state office buildings.''
is thus dependent on state government for its income, the PBC's debt should be treated as
state debt. As state debt, any surplus or profits should likewise have to be considered state
money. The state, rather than the PBC, would be free to use the surplus as it chooses.
168. The New York State Housing Finance Agency funds these facilities, but does not
construct or initiate projects. Rather, it finances the work of private developers or other PBCs
by granting construction or mortgage loans or by entering into lease-purchase arrangements.
In the case of lease-purchase arrangements, a PBC enters into a lease agreement with the
Housing Finance Agency which then issues its own bonds in order to finance the PBC. Rental
payments owed by the PBC to the Housing Finance Agency are paid from state monies
pursuant to the lease-purchase contract entered into between the state and the PBC. DEBT-
LIKE COMMITMENTS of N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 19-21.
In 1962, the legislature created the State University Construction Fund (SUCF), a public
benefit corporation. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 371 (McKinney 1969). The SUCF can "construct,
acquire, reconstruct, rehabilitate, and improve such facilities, other than dormitories, (dor-
mitories can only be constructed by agreement with the Dormitory Authority), by its own
employees, [or] by agreement with . . . any state agency . . . ... Id. § 376(2). However, the
SUCF cannot issue its own bonds. Id. § 377. Further, any agreement entered into by the
SUCF and a public benefit corporation (other than the Dormitory Authority) must provide
for (1) the construction or rehabilitation of the facility, and (2) the leasing of the facility to
the SUCF upon the completion of the project. Id. § 378(3). Thus, the SUCF has authority to
enter into lease-purchase agreements with HFA whereby HFA finances the construction of
the university facilities. Then pursuant to the contract between the state and the SUCF,
money from the State University Income Fund (which includes student tuition and fees) is
transferred to the "rental reserve accounts" of SUCF, id., to the extent necessary to meet
lease payments due the Housing Finance Agency from the SUCF. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS
OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 19-21.
The amount of debt the Housing Finance Agency may incur to finance state university
facilities, N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 47-a(2)(b) (McKinney 1976) and mental hygiene
facilities, id. § 47-b(2)(b), is limited to $3 billion and $705 million, respectively.
The financing of mental hygiene facilities is analogous to that of state universities: the
financing is undertaken pursuant to agreements between HFA and a PBC and rental pay-
ments are paid from monies which have been traditionally part of the general revenue of the
state.
169. The New York State Dormitory Authority funds health and correctional facilities.
The financial plans established to construct these facilities are comparable to those designed
to construct state university facilities. The legislature creates a fund or PBC which constructs
the projects with financing obtained by bond issues of another PBC. See note 169 supra. For
a detailed analysis, see DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 20-22; 1978
AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 27-28.
170. State and highway construction is financed by the New York State Thruway Author-
ity, The reconstruction and repair of state highways differs from the other arrangements in
that a PBC is not created. Instead, the Commissioner of transportation is authorized to enter
into contractual agreements, on behalf of the state, with the Thruway Authority for the
financing of construction needed on state highways. N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 10-a (McKinney Supp.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Correspondingly, the debt of the authorities resulting from lease-
purchase arrangements has increased substantially since 1963. In
that year, the debt outstanding as a result of state lease-purchase
agreements totalled $46 million.'72 State lease-purchase rental pay-
ments for the fiscal year 1977-1978 were $328 million and are pro-
jected to be $355 million in the fiscal year 1978-1979.1 3
The constitutionality of lease-purchase arrangements was chal-
lenged in N. Y Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Levitt.
Plaintiffs petitioned the New York Supreme Court to declare in-
valid a lease-purchase arrangement entered into by the state and
Albany County in 1965. Albany County was to finance, through
bond issues, the construction of the Albany South Mall, which con-
sists of state offices and cultural facilities.'75 The state contracted
to lease the buildings and make rental payments, for a period of
forty years, equal to the principal and interest on the indebtedness
incurred by the county, title to the property was to vest in the state
after the expiration of the lease.'70
Plaintiffs alleged that the agreement constituted the contracting
of state debt without the approval of the people at a general election
and was therefore in violation of the state constitution.'77 The merits
of the case were never reached. Both the supreme court and the
appellate division held that the statute of limitations had run on
the plaintiffs' cause of action and that the cause of action was
barred by laches, since the construction of the Mall was nearly
1978). For additional powers of the New York State Thruway Authority see N.Y. PuB. AUTH.
LAW § 376 (McKinney Supp. 1978). Payments made to the Thruway Authority pursuant to
this program derive from the State's Emergency Highway Reconditioning and Preservation
Fund. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 89 (McKinney 1974); DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra
note 152, at 23; 1978 AUDrr AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 28.
171. State office buildings are financed by retiring systems and municipalities. DEBT-LIKE
COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 17-19.
172. 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 27. A table indicating
the financial status of the individual authorities and municipalities pursuant to lease-
purchase agreements is also given in the Annual Report.
173. Official Statement, supra note 146, at 13.
174. 90 Misc. 2d 670, 395 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd mem 62 A.D.2d 1074, 404
N.Y.S.2d 55 (3d Dep't 1978), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 849, 386 N.E.2d 1336, 414 N.Y.S.2d
315 (1979).
175. Id. This mall is now known as the Nelson A. Rockefeller Plaza.
176.. 90 Misc. 2d at 671, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
177. Id. at 671, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 609-10. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
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completed.' 8 The effect on PBCs would have been wide-ranging had
the court held these lease-purchase arrangements unconstitutional.
In the absence of constitutional amendment, or other financial ar-
rangement, the municipalities and public authorities involved
would have been solely responsible for the payments of principal
and interest on bonds issued by PBCs.75
B. Moral Obligation Bonds
Where a public authority is authorized by statute to maintain a
debt or rental reserve fund,' 0 and this fund is depleted below a
prescribed level, the state is permitted to appropriate state monies
to replenish the fund.'"' The commitment of the state to provide
assistance to an authority with insufficient funds to meet its rental
or debt payments is referred to as its "moral obligation."'' 2 The
nature of this commitment is twofold: first, the payments, accord-
ing to the provisions of the authorities' enabling statutes, are per-
missive rather than mandatory;' 3 second, although the statutory
provisions do not impose a legal obligation on the state to make any
payments, bond market analyses noted that the state is "morally"
obligated to apportion money to an authority when needed.' 4 "[In
the words of a major bond rating service, 'it is expected that the
State of New York will remain at all times under strong moral
178. 62 A.D.2d 1074, 1075, 404 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57-58 (3d Dep't 1978).
179. The state currently owes approximately $3.5 billion in rental payments.
180. A debt or rental service reserve fund provides a margin of safety to bondholders in
that it provides monies to meet the debt service of the corporation.
181. See note 189-90 infra and accompanying text.
182. The Dormitory Authority apparently originated the "moral obligation" commit-
ment. As stated by the Moreland Commission:
The clearest forerunner of the present moral obligation bond was a device employed
by the Dormitory Authority in the late 1950's. It issued revenue bonds that carried a
covenant promising that the Authority would not fail to inform the State of any
depletion in its bond reserves, and would ask the state for an appropriation to replenish
them. The moral obligation housing bond [of the Housing Finance Agency] created
in 1960 differed only in that it was backed by statutory assurance that such an appro-
priation would be proposed by the Governor to the legislature.
MORELAND REPORT, supra note 139, at 86.
Many lease purchase arrangements are also supported by "moral obligation" commit-
ments. An example is the State University Construction Fund (SUCF). N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
371(1) (McKinney 1969). See note 168 supra.
183. 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 27.
184. Id.
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suasion to maintain its schedule of charges and programs of aid to
the end that these bonds will remain in good standing.' "185 Further-
more, except in a limited number of cases, no provision is made for
the repayment of any state assistance to debt service reserve
funds.' However, because the letter, if not the spirit, of the consti-
tution is not violated, this extension of such credit is not subject to
constitutional referendum requirements." 7 Thus, as a practical
matter, the credit of the state stands as security for the indebted-
ness of the authorities.'
The enabling statutes of the various public authorities specify
how state funds are to be appropriated in the case of a "moral
obligation." The typical statutory provision states that if the au-
thority has insufficient revenues, that is, reserve funds do not cover
the "amount of principal and interest maturing and becoming due"
in the following year, or if the authority becomes obligated to draw
on the reserve, its chairman informs the Governor and the State
Director of the Budget.' 9 Under its "moral obligation," the legisla-
185. Id.
186. DEBT-LIKE COMMITMENTS OF N.Y.S., supra note 152, at 36. As of 1974, four Public
Authorities (the Job Development Authority, N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1828 (McKinney 1970),
the Mortgage Agency, id. § 2408(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978), the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority, formerly known as the Atomic and Space Develop-
ment Corporation, id. § 1860-a(4), and the Battery Park City Authority, id. § 1977-b(4)), were
required to repay the state for the "normal obligation" assistance it provided. Typically, the
provision provides that:
[a]ll amounts paid over to the authority by the State ... [pursuant to the reserve
fund support clause] shall constitute and be accounted for as advances by the state
to the authority and, subject to the rights of the holders of any bonds or notes of the
authority theretofore or thereafter issued, shall be repaid to the State from all available
operating revenues of the authority in excess of debt service reserve fund requirements
and operating expenses.
Id. § 1860-a(4) (N.Y.S. Energy Research and Development Authority).
187. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
188. As early as 1938, it was recognized that there was a strong possibility of State credit
backing the obligations of the public authorities. A 1938 constitutional committee report
states that if creditors of a particular Authority which could not meet its obligations, elected
to foreclose on the Authority's project "the municipality or the state might feel itself bound
to take over the debt of the defaulting authority, not only to prevent foreclosure of what is
after all public property, but also, perhaps to salvage the public credit, which would otherwise
be damaged." XI NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMM. REPORT: PROBLEMS
RELATING TO HOME RULE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT 243 (1938).
189. The following excerpt from the Housing Finance Agency Act illustrates the statutory
language used to set forth the state's commitment:
[t]o assure the continued operation and solvency of the agency for the carrying out
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ture then apportions state monies to the debt service or rental re-
serve found of the authority.' 0
The state has hitherto guaranteed the financial community's
expectation that the bonds of a public authority are properly paid.'"'
For instance, from 1975-1978, the legislature, in accordance with the
"moral obligation" provision of the State Housing Finance Agency
(HFA), appropriated $10.1 million to the HFA to replenish its debt
service reserve fund.' 2 During the same period, the state provided
a total of approximately $381 million in "moral obligation" finan-
cial assistance.'93 As of March 31, 1978, there was approximately
$10.5 billion in "moral obligation" bonds and notes outstanding.'94
of the public purposes of this article, provision is made .. .for the accumulation in
the . ..reserve fund of an amount equal to the maximum amount of principal and
interest maturing and becoming due ... in any succeeding calendar year on .. .
bonds of the agency then outstanding. . . .In order further to assure mainte-
nance of the .. .reserve fund, there shall be annually apportioned and paid to the
agency for deposit in the . . . reserve fund such sum, if any, as shall be certified by
the chairman of the agency to the governor and director of the budget as necessary to
restore the . . . fund to an amount equal to the maximum amount of principal and
interest maturing and becoming due ... in any succeeding calendar year on .. .
bonds of the agency then outstanding. . . . (emphasis added).
N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 47(1)(d), 47(3)(d), 47(5)(c), 47(6)(c), 47(8)(c), 47(9)(c),
47(10)(c), 47(12)(c), 47(14)(c) (McKinney 1976). See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1291(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1979) (New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 371(1) (McKinney 1969) (State University Construction Fund).
190. N.Y. Pav. Hous. FIN. LAW § 47 (McKinney 1976).
191. The 1978 Comptroller's Annual Report states:
The fiscal stability of the State is related, at least in part, to the fiscal stability of the
authorities. The closing of the public securities market in 1975 to bonds and notes
issued by UDC [Urban Development Corporation] and certain other authorities and
by the State resulted in the State's taking action to sustain investor confidence in, and
to provide for the fiscal stability of the authorities and the State itself to prevent
disruption of the operations of the authorities.
1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 35.
Further recognition of the "moral obligation" of the State is found in § 583 of the Public
Authority Law where the statute in reference to the Thousand Islands Bridge Authority
states: "The bonds, notes, and other obligations of the authority shall not be a legal or moral
debt of the state. . . .No recent action by the state in recognizing any legal or moral
obligation for any indebtedness of any other authority shall in any way be construed as
creating any liability for any indebtedness of this authority." (emphasis added). N.Y. PuB.
AUTH. LAW § 583 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
192. Official Statement, supra note 146, at 14.
193. Id.
194. 1978 AuDrr AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 28-30. Of this $10.5
billion, the Municipal Assistance Corporation, a Public Benefit Corporation, is authorized
to issue up to $5.2 billion in bonds and notes in order to provide assistance to New York City.
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Thus, the state has incurred millions of dollars of "debt," sup-
ported by its "moral obligation," apparently in direct conflict with
article X, section 5 of the New York State Constitution. '
Due to the difficulties encountered by several authorities in both
marketing bonds and meeting their obligations, and the resultant
"obligation" by the state to take action to sustain investor confid-
ence, legislation was adopted, effective in 1976, imposing limits on
the amount of "moral obligation" bonds that an authority could
issue.'" This "Capping Legislation"'' 7 limited the amount of "moral
obligation" indebtedness to the amount of bonds and notes already
outstanding plus any additional bonds and notes necessary to fi-
nance projects already under construction.' 8 Special dollar limita-
tions were also set.'" In many cases where no "moral obligation"
bonds were outstanding, the "moral obligation" provisions were re-
pealed.2"
C. Other Methods of State Aid
In addition to lease-purchase and "moral obligation" financing,
the State provides the larger State-wide public authorities with
195. See note 158 supra; Quirk & Wein, supra note 133, at 569-70.
196. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 38; see 1978 AuDfr AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136,
at 29; Official Statement, supra note 146, at 28.
197. 1978 AuDrr AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 29.
198. See note 196 supra. The total amount of bonds and notes necessary to finance pro-
jects in progress is determined by the New York State Authorities Control Board whose
determination is conclusive. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 38.
199. Official Statement, supra note 146, at 28; see 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 136, at 30. The maximum limitation is reduced as the "moral obligation"
bonds are repaid. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 38.
200. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 38. The state also created the Public Authorities Control Board
(PACB) (N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAw § 50 (McKinney Supp. 1978)) and formulated the Authority
Build-Out Plan. The PACB must approve any additional financing or construction of the
Build-Out Authorities and certain other "moral obligation" Authorities (e.g., Battery Park
City Authority, N.Y.S. Project Finance Agency, N.Y.S. Urban Development Corporation).
Official Statement, supra note 146, at 20, 20-27. See 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 38; N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS § 7417(1)(c) (McKinney 1978) (N.Y.S. Medical Care Facilities Finance Agency Act).
In February 1976, the Build-Out Plan was formulated to facilitate re-entry of the Build-
Out Authorities into the public securities market. There are four Build-Out Authorities: the
Housing Finance Agency, the Environmental Facilities Corporation, the Dormitory Author-
ity, and the Medical Care Facilities Finance Authority. The Plan provides for $2.59 billion
in financial assistance to complete projects and to refinance bond anticipation notes through
September, 1978. Financing needs as of October, 1978 were estimated to be $1.1 billion. 1978
AuDrr AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 35; Official Statement, supra note
146, at 24-27.
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financial support in several ways which are within constitutional
debt limitations. "Hard cash" appropriations are one such means
of financial support. These appropriations are outright grants given.
by the state, derived from both tax revenues and full faith and
credit bond funds.20' Public authorities use these "hard cash" grants
to provide initial working capital or to finance facilities. 0 In addi-
tion, the state has used "hard cash" appropriations to forgive au-
thority debt resulting from unpaid state "first instance," loans3 3
"First instance" advances are interest-free loans provided by the
state legislature to authorities in order to enable them to begin
operation of facilities and programs.210 The authorities are obligated
to reimburse the state for the loans either from bond proceeds or
operating revenues.0 5 In order for an authority to make timely re-
payment of advances, it is essential that it be financially viable.
However, many of the authorities were not fiscally sound and thus
were unable to repay state loans. During 1964-1970, $88 million in
advances was liquidated by state "hard cash" appropriations,20
and during the next two years the state similarly forgave another
$63.1 million in authority debt .207 Despite early warnings that a
large percentage of "first instance" advances were of doubtful col-
lectibility, the state lent the public authorities a total of $46.8 mil-
lion in "first instance" advances during the 1977-1978 fiscal year.10
201. 1 N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, STATEWIDE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: A FOURTH
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 10 (Study No. 1, 1972).
202. Id.
203. See note 204-05 infra and accompanying text.
204. 1 N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, STATEWIDE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: A FOURTH
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 11 (Study No. 1, 1972).
205. Id.
206. STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF AUDITS AND
ACCOUNTS, AUDIT OF NEW YORK STATE, NEW YORK CITY, AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 54 (2 Year
Period ended March 31, 1972).
207. Thus, during the 8 year period, $154.1 million in advances were "forgiven" by the
State. 1 N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL, STATEWIDE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: A FOURTH BRANCH
OF GOVERNMENT 11 (Study No- 1, 1972). This constituted 37 percent of the "first instance"
loans made by the state. In effect, the state writes the loans off as "bad debts" and appropri-
ates "hard cash" and funds to liquidate these debts. 1 N.Y. DEP'T OF AUDIT AND CONTROL,
STATEWIDE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: A FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 10-11 (Study No. 1, 1972);
STATE OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF AUDITS AND ACCOUNTS,
AUDIT OF NEW YORK STATE, NEW YORK CITY, AND PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 54 (2 Year Period ended
March 31, 1972).
208. 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 14.
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As of March 31, 1978, the authorities owed the state $325 million
for outstanding "first instance" advances210°
The constitution permits the state, without a public of referen-
dum to guarantee unconditionally the debt of three types of authori-
ties: highway authorities, t 0 port authorities,"' and authorities cre-
ated to construct industrial or manufacturing plants designed to
improve employment opportunities.2 2 As of September 30, 1978, the
state has used this authority to guarantee unconditionally, by its
full faith and credit, the debt of three public benefit corporations .21
The debt of these authorities has made the state contingently liable
as a guarantor for $521 million of bonds and notes issued.211 There
is little danger that an authority which generates revenues greater
than its debt service and operating expenses will ever be a drain
on the treasury of the state. Strong authorities, such as the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey or the Triborough Bridge
and Tunnel Authority, produce excess revenues which are then rein-
vested into larger and usually more successful revenue-producing
projects. t
Beginning in 1960, however, authorities have become involved in
public developments, such as hospitals,2 1 educational facilities," 7
209. Official Statement, supra note 146, at 27.
210. N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 6.
211. Id. art. X, § 7.
212. Id. [sic](so numbered by the Legislature, should be § 8).
213. Specifically, the state has committed itself to make payments on certain borrowings
of the New York State Thruway Authority, N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 350-75 (McKinney 1970),
the Job Development Authority, id. §§ 1800-1834, and the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6401-7171 (McKinney 1979); 1978 AUDIT AND CONTROL
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 136, at 35.
214. Official Statement, supra note 146, at 12.
215. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 6401-
7171 (McKinney 1979), the first Authority, created in 1921, was originally authorized to settle
problems in connection with the harbor. XI NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
COMM. REPORT: PROBLEMS RELATING TO HOME RULE AND LOCAL Gov'T. 238-40 (1938). Today
the Authority has over 8000 employees and its annual operating budget is larger than the
operating budget of the New York State Department of TranslJortation. Port Authority facili-
ties now include the $575 million World Trade Center, three major airports and two minor
ones, eight marine terminals, four bridges, two tunnel complexes, a multistate transportation
center, a rapid transit line, and trade development offices in nine cities. A. WALSH, THE
PUBLIC'S BUSINESS 89-103 (1978).
216. E.g., New York State Medical Care Facilities Finance Agency Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL.
LAWS §§ 7411-7431 (McKinney 1979).
217. E.g., State University Construction Fund, N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 370-84 (McKinney
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and dormitories,21 which traditionally have not been self-
supporting.219 Authorities venturing into these types of arrange-
ments would thus have difficulty financing their operations and
meeting their debt service. Consequently, it is up to the state to
back these "weak" authorities. This is necessary in order to sustain
investor confidence in both the authorities and the state. Since it
is unconstitutional to guarantee such debt, "moral obligation" fi-
nancing was formulated to serve the dual purpose of assisting the
authorities and avoiding constitutional strictures.2 0
In the case of lease-purchase agreements, the state contracts with
an authority to build a needed facility, agreeing to lease it when the
facility is completed. The state, unable to build the facility itself
since it would then incur debt beyond its constitutional debt limita-
tion, agrees to make rental payments high enough to cover the au-
thority's debt service. The state has managed to do indirectly what
it cannot do directly. Thus, lease-purchase arrangements serve to
circumvent constitutional debt limitations. 22'
In sum, New York State has substantially more involvement with
the financing of public benefit corporations than is strictly permit-
ted by the constitution.
D. The New York City Stabilization Reserve Corporation and
Municipal Assistance Corporation
City funds were necessary to provide essential services to its in-
habitants and to pay its debt to holders of outstanding securities.
In order to meet these obligations, New York City depended on its
ability to market new securities. However, this source of funds is
viable only where investors remain confident in the newly-issued
securities. In the first months of 1975, the city, forced to meet its
previous short-term borrowing obligations, was barely able to mar-
ket its debt. Consequently, serious short-term debt and cash flow
problems were encountered. 212
In 1974, the Legislature created the Stabilization Reserve Corpo-
1969); Dormitory Authority, N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 1675-1692 (McKinney 1970).
218. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1675-1692 (McKinney 1970).
219. See Quirk & Wein, supra note 133, at 597.
220. See notes 180-200 supra and accompanying text.
221. See notes 160-79 supra and accompanying text.
222. See note 242 infra.
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ration ("SRC") in order to raise funds for the city through the sale
of the corporation's bonds.223 The stated purpose of the SRC was to
"assist [the] city to enable it to provide . . . essential services
. . "22 In short, by selling its own bonds, the SRC was to generate
sufficient capital to meet its own debt service costs and, at the same
time, provide much needed relief to New York by contributing to
the city's general fund."'
The SRC's debt service was to be paid out of a capital reserve
fund which was to be supplied by the sale of corporate notes or
bonds, city appropriations, and "any other monies which may be
made available to the corporation . . . from any other source."22'
However, the statute expressly absolved the city from any manda-
tory obligation to make contributions.2 7 The Legislature had pro-
vided that the state, by channelling sums otherwise going directly
to the city, 28 would contribute an amount sufficient to meet the
fund's current debt service costs.1 22 Although the provisions for con-
tributions existed, the statute expressly stated that "neither the
state nor the city shall be liable" on the obligations, since the debts
were solely those of the SRC. 0
Despite its good intentions, the SRC was unable to market its
securities. Investors were reluctant to buy the SRC's bonds because
the city could not become indebted on the obligations. Although
the SRC was ineffective, as a practical matter, it did survive a
constitutional challenge, 3' and in doing so helped pave the way for
223. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAw §§ 2530-2551 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
224. Id. § 2533.
225. Id. § 2538.
226. Id. § 2537.
227. Id.
228. E.g., the city's share of the stock transfer tax; federal and state aid appropriated for
the city. Id. § 2540.
229. Id. The statute defines the requisite level of the capital reserve fund in terms of that
amount needed to meet interest and principal due and sinking fund payments due on corpo-
rate bonds. Id. § 2531(10).
230. Id. § 2542.
231. Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
In Wein, the court would not accept the argument that the SRC was an unconstitutional
avoidance of the full faith and credit provision of the state constitution. (N.Y. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2, para. 2.). 36 N.Y.2d at 617, 331 N.E.2d at 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The court
distinguished between the loaning of credit and the appropriation of a gift of money for a
public purpose. SRC contributions were characterized as a gift of money. 36 N.Y.2d at 619,
331 N.E.2d at 519, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 557. As such, they were held constitutional and not
city debt obligations.
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the creation of the New York City Municipal Assistance Corpora-
tion ("MAC").23'
MAC, a public benefit corporation2 3  created in June, 1975 by the
New York State Municipal Corporation Act,' was specifically de-
signed to administer to the City financial assistance during its emer-
gency period.2 35 The state legislature declared a dual statutory pur-
pose for MAC: "to assist the City of New York in providing essential
services to its inhabitants without interruption and [to create]
investor confidence in the soundness of the obligations of such city
so that it may retain its ability to sell its obligations to the pub-
lic."2 31 In furtherance of this purpose MAC is empowered to market
its own bonds and notes, the proceeds of which may be loaned or
given to the city.237 MAC does not have the power to levy taxes, nor
is its debt covered by the general obligations of the state or city. 8
Hence, neither the state nor city is required to appropriate the
funds to meet MAC debt service. However, all MAC debt is sup-
ported by the state's "moral obligation" 239 to repay the bonds if
necessary.2 0 In order to restore investor confidence, the city agreed
to take steps to balance its budget process by introducing a better
accounting system and phasing out its practice of capitalizing oper-
232. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 3030-3040 (McKinney Supp. 1978). For a discussion of the
emergency legislation for New York City and the constitutional attacks see Comment, New
York-A City In Crisis: Fiscal Emergency Legislation And The Constitutional Attacks, 6
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65 (1977).
233. See notes 131-223 supra and accompanying text.
234. N.Y. PuB. AUT. LAW §§ 3001-3021 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
235. Id. § 3031. The consequences of a failure of the city to meet its obligations was seen
as resulting in an end to the city as a viable governmental entity; endangering the health,
safety and welfare of its inhabitants; shaking the status of the city as the financial capital
of the nation and the world; and causing a great exodus from the city of corporate and
individual taxpayers, imposing an even greater burden on those remaining. MUNICIPAL AsSIS-
TANCE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK, FINANCIAL PLAN AND LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, § 1, at 31, 32
(September, 1975).
236. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 3031 (McKinney Supp. 1978). MAC has nine voting directors
chosen by the governor, four of which are recommended by the mayor. In addition, six non-
voting members are appointed by agreement of the four political leaders of the Legislature,
the city's Board of Estimate and the vice chairman of the City Council. Id. § 3034.
237. Id. § 3033.
238. Id. § 3016. Section 3012(c) provides that every note and bond issued is a general
obligation of the corporation.
239. See notes 182-202 supra and accompanying text.
240. THE FISCAL OBSERVER, AN INDEPENDENT REPORT ON NEW YORK CITY'S FINANCES 1
(February 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited THE FISCAL OBSERVER].
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ating expenses.2'
MAC bonds have been issued under two general bond resolutions:
First General Resolution Bonds and Second General Resolution
Bonds. First General Resolution Bonds are general obligations of the
corporation."' Two special funds, the Debt Service Fund"' and the
Capital Reserve Fund,' have been established for the service of the
First General Resolution Bonds. The revenues of MAC pledged to
the payment of the First General Resolution Bonds are derived prin-
cipally from the sales tax2" and, secondly, from the stock transfer
tax."' Revenues from the sales tax consist of collections within the
city of the state sales tax and compensating use taxes which, hith-
erto, were imposed by New York City itself.47 Revenues from the
stock transfer tax are derived from the state's tax on sales and
transfers of certain securities.2" These revenues are diverted from
the city to MAC.4 They are not available to the city or any agency
other than MAC until the current requirements of the corporation,
including debt service on the bonds, have been satisfied. Addition-
ally, MAC revenues not otherwise pledged are available for the pay-
ment of the First General Resolution Bonds.3 0
Second General Resolution Bonds also are general obligations of
MAC."' These bonds are payable from any available revenues of the
corporation not otherwise pledged. Two special funds have also been
established for these bonds: The Bond Service Fund252 and the Capi-
tal Reserve Fund. 53 The principal sources of revenue to MAC for the
241. See generally N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 3038 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
242. Id. § 3012(c).
243. The Debt Service Fund is used to pay interest on principal and redemption of MAC's
bonds and notes. Id. § 3036(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
244. The capital reserve fund is used to pay the principal on the corporation's bonds. Id.
§ 3036(3).
245. N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 1107, 1108 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
246. Id. § 270 (McKinney 1966).
247. Id. 9H 1107, 1108 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
248. Id. § 270 (McKinney 1966).
249. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 3036 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
250. Id. § 3036(3). The sources of these funds are the proceeds from sales of MAC bonds
or notes, state appropriations, and any income or interest earned as a result of investment of
the amounts deposited in those funds.
251. Id. § 3012(c).
252. Id. § 3036-a(1).
253. Id. § 3036-a(2).
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Second General Resolution Bonds are per capita aid, 54 the sales
tax255 and the stock transfer tax.26 Revenues from the sales tax and
the stock transfer tax are pledged to the payment of Second General
Resolution Bonds only to the extent those revenues are not pledged
to pay debt service on obligations issued under the corporation's
First General Bond Resolution. 257
The state has agreed to appropriate sums only to the corpora-
tion, 258 but there is no constitutional guarantee that the taxes from
which the funds are supplied will continue to exist. This possibility
does pose a risk to investors, though it is unlikely these taxes would
be eliminated.
The principal purpose of MAC is to refinance a substantial share
of the short-term debt of New York City. This is to be accomplished
by replacing more than $3 billion of this debt with long-term obliga-
tions of the corporation secured by the taxes discussed above. '
Since city debt is then cancelled, liability for such debt is actually
shifted from the city to MAC .2 Further, upon certification by the
Mayor of New York City to MAC of the amounts necessary to pay
the city's operating expenses or debt service, MAC may pay such
amount to the city or, alternatively, buy city obligations up to the
amount of the city's certified requirement.261
MAC's initial public offering of July 10, 1975 of $1 billion in bonds
was less than completely successful; the public market absorbed
only $550 million thereof, with the balance being taken by underwri-
ters. 262 The public lacked confidence in the city's ability to regain
solvency.263 The corporation realized that more stringent manage-
ment and financial controls on the city were required in order to
254. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54 (McKinney 1974).
255. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1107, 1108 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
256. Id. § 270 (McKinney 1966).
257. Id.
258. See N.Y. PuB. AUtr. LAW §§ 3036, 3036-a (McKinney Supp. 1978).
259. [1976] MAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
260. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 3035 (McKinney Supp. 1978). Such cancellation does not
apply to BANs. If MAC receives these notes and delivers them to the city, the city must
pay the accrued interest and principal or pay the accrued interest and exchange city BANs
of equal principal and interest rate. Id.
261. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 3037 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
262. [1976] MAC REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The underwriters are the large lenders,
the banks and the brokerage houses.
263. Id. at 12.
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make investors more willing to purchase MAC obligations." 4 De-
spite several efforts towards reform, the corporation was hard-
pressed to meet the city's August, 1975 cash requirements."0 5
As a response to imminent financial collapse in September, 1975,
and in an effort to gain the support of the state and federal govern-
ments, the state legislature passed the Financial Emergency Act
for the City of New York on September 5, 1975.66 This legislation
created the Emergency Financial Control Board2"7 and directed the
city to prepare a three year financial plan." The plan was to be
reviewed by the Board. In addition, the release of city revenues and
all major city expenditures and contracts were subject to the
Board's review.2"°
At present, then, New York City's financial plans are controlled
by MAC and the Emergency Financial Control Board. MAC has the
power to issue its own debt and the right to specified tax proceeds.
The Emergency Financial Control Board, separately from MAC,
overseas the city's financial plans.
There are three groups of major creditors involved in the New
York City recovery effort:270 the city's past lenders (i.e., the banks
and brokerage houses), the city pension funds (who agreed to buy
a large amount of MAC bonds after substantial negotiations), and
the federal government (which introduced a seasonal loan program
to begin in fiscal year 1976 and end in fiscal year 1978).11 The latter
two creditors were included when the private lenders became un-
willing "to continue playing the game alone. 2 2 These three groups
have spent the past three years negotiating with MAC and the city
over the deferral, exchange, stretch-out, and general rearranging of
city debt. This has been accomplished through a maze of arrange-
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 1975 N.Y. Laws chs. 868, 869, 870.
267. Id. ch. 868 § 5.
268. Id. § 8.
269. Id. § 7.
270, THE FISCAL OBSERVER, supra note 240, at 9.
271, Id.
272. Id.
273. MAC discusses the general features of its history and publishes its audited financial
statements in its 1976 ANNUAL REPORT (Sept. 30, 1976), 1977 ANNUAL REPORT (Nov. 14, 1977)
and 1978 ANNUAL REPORT (Sept. 28, 1978). MAC distributes free of charge its annual reports
and quarterly financial statements as well as the official statement for its most recent bond
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ments and devices for refinancing.2 4 Simply stated, "MAC [has]
managed to provide the city with cash proceeds from financing
while holding off cash outlays that without MAC would have gone
to pay off old creditors."21
The most recent financing package was developed in November,
1978.21 The city expects $4.5 billion in financing before fiscal 1983
and MAC will provide at least $2.8 billion of this amount.277 City
pension funds and local financial institutions are committed to buy
$1.8 billion of these MAC bonds under the November plan.278 The
remaining $1 billion is to be met by sales to the public, hopefully
by 1981.277 The city, in addition, hopes to market $950 million of
its own unguaranteed bonds to the public in 1981 and 1982.8 ° How-
ever, if this offering is unsuccessful, MAC will substitute its own
securities for up to $900 million in public sales. 28'
The outlook for MAC's debt issuing operations after 1982 is uncer-
tain. As part of the agreement with the municipal pension funds and
financial institutions to buy the $1.8 billion in MAC bonds issuable
under the plan, MAC promised it would never have more than $8.8
billion in First and Second Resolution Bonds outstanding. 8 2 Assum-
ing MAC substitutes all city bond issues by 1984, the $8.8 billion
limit will have been reached if the city fails to achieve access to the
market on its own.2 In that event, without a waiver of the restric-
tion or the authorization of a Third Resolution Bond by the state
legislature, MAC would be foreclosed from issuing more debt. 2"
Importantly, MAC has promised not to issue Third Resolution
Bonds unless it buys city bonds with an investment grade rating in
offering. Contact: MAC, 1 World Trade Center, Room 8901, New York, New York 10048;
phone, (212) 775-0010.
274. See id. for specific information sources.
275. THE FISCAL OBSERVER, supra note 240, at 9.
276. Id. at 2.
277. Id. at 1-2.
278. Id. at 2. As of February 22, 1979, of the $1.8 billion, MAC has sold $401 million in
private placements. Id.
279. Id. As of February 22, 1979, one-quarter of the one billion figure was sold. Id.
280, Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 4.
283. Id. at 4-5.
284. Id. at 5.
1979]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
return. 5 Furthermore, the city must have balanced its previous
year's budget according to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples.28 As a recent report pointed out:
If the city could meet all these conditions, it would have market access on
its own in 1984-and theoretically would not need MAC anymore. But MAC
cannot issue more debt unless all these conditions are met. In effect, if exist-
ing agreements are not changed and if MAC has not restored the city's fiscal
credibility by 1984, MAC will be written out of all future scripts for financing
New York City. 7
IV. Conclusion
Despite its good intentions, the New York Legislature's piecemeal
revision of the New York Constitution's Local Finance Article re-
sulted in New York City's exclusion of significant amounts of actual
debt from its financial reports. Thus able to "overspend" its avail-
able resources, New York City used fiscal practices which under-
score the inexorable conclusion that constitutional debt ceilings
were, and continue to be, phantom regulations of municipal debt
incurrence.
The need for thorough and decisive reform is clear. Absent such
action, municipalities will be free to repeat New York City's diffi-
cult choice between providing adequate public services and finan-
cial collapse. Cognizant of the need for reform and the realities of
political expediency, the proposed Local Finance Article advanced
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York goes far in
285. Id. City bonds would not be able to receive an investment grade rating (i.e. credit
rating) without having regained sufficient fiscal stability so that it could achieve some market
access for its own obligations.
286. Id.
287. Id. New York City's future in the market is uncertain. Despite the successful sale of
$275 million in short-term notes in early 1979, most analysts are wary of the fact that the
notes were state guaranteed. In addition, Moody's Investors Service has refused to rate New
York City bonds higher than "undesirable [and] speculative." As justification for its posi-
tion, Moody's cites "the lack of any meaningful long-term remedial measures" to improve
the city's fiscal position. Since investment-grade ratings are crucial to N.Y. City's ability to
reenter the long-term debt market, its funding future appears bleak, particularly for the
scheduled public sale of $300 million in bonds in 1981, followed by $650 million in 1982. As
well, federal loan guarantees and private loans expire in 1982. Finally, the city's spending
has not decreased significantly. Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
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striking a balance between the need for municipal funding and the
ability of cities and towns to generate massive debt almost at will.
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